Features of Part D gave rise to broad concern that the drug benefit would negatively impact prescription utilization among the six million dual eligible beneficiaries, either during the transition from state Medicaid to Part D coverage, or in the long-run. At the same time, Part D contained...

We analyze Medicare Part D's net effect on elderly out-of-pocket (OOP) costs and use of prescription drugs using a dataset containing 1.4 billion prescription records from Wolters Kluwer Health (WKH). These data span the period December 2004-December 2007 and include pharmacy customers whose age...

This paper investigates the effects of reducing subsidies for private health insurance on public sector expenditure for hospital care. An econometric framework using simultaneous equation models is developed to analyse the interrelated decisions on the intensity and type of health care use and...

Medicare continues to implement payment reforms that shift reimbursement from fee-for-service toward episode-based payment, affecting average and marginal payment. We contrast the effects of two reforms for home health agencies. The home health interim payment system in 1997 lowered both types...

We examine provider responses to the Medicare inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF) prospective payment system (PPS), which simultaneously reduced marginal reimbursement and increased average reimbursement. IRFs could respond to the PPS by changing the number of patients admitted, admitting...

The Danish hospital sector faces a significant rebuilding program driven by recent regional reform and guidelines for acute admission hospitals. Within the next 5–10 years, the number of public hospitals offering acute admission will be reduced from 35 to approximately 20 larger hospitals. As...

Patients switching physicians involves costs to the patients because of less continuity of care. From a theoretical model we derive that inferior physician quality as perceived by patients, implies patient shortage for the physician and more patients switching physicians. By means of a unique...

We study gatekeeping physicians’ referrals of patients to specialty care. We derive theoretical results when competition in the physician market intensifies. First, due to competitive pressure, physicians refer patients to specialty care more often. Second, physicians earn more by treating...

We study optimal public health care rationing and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and illness severity (defined as treatment cost). Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Rationed consumers may purchase from a monopolistic private market. We...

We examine provider responses to the Medicare inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF) prospective payment system (PPS), which simultaneously reduced marginal reimbursement and increased average reimbursement. IRFs could respond to the PPS by changing the total number of patients admitted,...