Similar Search Results

Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets

Alcalde, José - In: Review of Economic Design 1 (1994) 1, pp. 275-287

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370568

Matching with externalities : The role of prudence and social connectedness in stability

Braitt, Milton dos Santos; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo - In: Journal of mathematical economics 92 (2021), pp. 95-102

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012654180

On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games

Sáiz, M; Hendrix, Eligius; Olieman, Niels - In: Computational Economics 28 (2006) 3, pp. 251-275

outlined. To compute stability, the new notation is used for implementation into computer coding. Implementation and … of being stable and/or effective. This paper focuses on computing stability in a game on multiple coalition formation … computation aspects are discussed. Numerical illustration of the algorithm shows that stability varies with the applied membership …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067833

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - In: Games and economic behavior 104 (2017), pp. 222-229

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793353

Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets

Azevedo, Eduardo M. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 207-223

This paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive two-sided matching market. Firms and workers may have heterogeneous preferences over matches on the other side, and the model allows for both uniform and personalized wages or contracts. To make the model tractable, I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738054

Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility

Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 143-156

We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about individualsʼ skills is private, utilities are strictly increasing in the partnerʼs skill and satisfy increasing differences. Skills can be either revealed or kept hidden, but while agents on one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049892

Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets

Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - In: Economics Letters 118 (2013) 1, pp. 237-239

The absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603145

Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets

Romero-Medina, Antonio - In: Theory and Decision 58 (2005) 3, pp. 305-324

This paper presents a procedure to select equitable stable allocations in two-sided matching markets without side payments. The Equitable set is computed using the Equitable algorithm. The algorithm limits the set of options available for each agent throughout the procedure. The stable matchings...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678328

`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings

Romero-Medina, Antonio - In: Theory and Decision 50 (2001) 3, pp. 197-212

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005709871

Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 44 (2015) 4, pp. 903-932

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011432937

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