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We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009766
We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … something which has become impossible. The model offers insight on the relative importance of proposal power and commitment for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330
This Paper analyses strategic bargaining between two agents each of whom negotiates on behalf of a principal. The principals face uncertainty about the bargaining skills of their agents as measured by the agents' abilities to assess the opponent's preferences. Agents then have an incentive to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067665
This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature such as Rubinstein (1985) and Gale (1986 and 1987) by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as job centres and newspapers in the labour market, or real estate agents in the housing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114149
We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785188
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371063
We model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies, one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date. Suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically: one player values the existing pie more than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702848
attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181
A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie. If the demands add up to more than one, the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the otherʼs offer. While both parties sticking to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049846
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