This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a …

of elements which are commonly considered in the economic theories of institutions, social capital, reciprocity and …

which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an …Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under … indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of …

We consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations. We show that whereas aggregate … conflict effort is always the same in evolutionary equilibrium, larger populations have greater individual subjective costs of … conflict effort. …

contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each … component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and …

earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate. We also show … ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. …

explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the …