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Europeanization of EU member-state competition policy: The commission's leadership role
Barros, Pedro P.; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo - In: International Review of Law and Economics 34 (2013) C, pp. 41-51
1994–2005) on European merger control, we find that changes in the EC's proclivity to remedy mergers are reflected in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664054
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Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083745
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Anatomy of Cartel Contracts
Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084010
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The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue
Bageri, Vasiliki; Katsoulacos, Yannis; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084408
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A Simple Theory of Predation
Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973970
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Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools
Barros, Pedro Pita; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but also an important deterrence effect … unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of different antitrust actions – Prohibitions, Remedies …, and Monitorings – to deter firms from engaging in mergers. We employ cross-jurisdiction/pan-time data on merger policy to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791805
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The International Dimension of the Antitrust Practice in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
Mavroidis, Petros C; Neven, Damien J - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
. Problems are most severe in the Czech republic. (iii) Anti-trust agencies in all three countries have attempted to advocate … become even more independent. (iv) Anti-trust agencies in all three countries could indeed be pursuing objectives of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792198
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How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?
Barros, Pedro Luis Pita; Clougherty, Joseph A.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577815
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Cartels Uncovered
Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the efficiency of competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that answers the question, taking into account that often we do not know whether a cartel exists in an industry or not. Our model identifies key policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468608
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Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers
Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468660