We explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests. Our basic set-up and the nature of the questions continue the work of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bib15">Grossman and Hart (1980)</xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="bib17">Harris and Raviv (1988)</xref>, and Blair, Golbe and Gerard (1989). We consider three...

We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two <italic>lobbyists</italic> compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists' budget constraints and...

The model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices ar e determined in first-price auctions. It combines competition over ti me, familiar from the pairwise meeting models, with instantaneous bid ding competition. It inquires how different properties of the model d etermine the...

The main idea of this article is that geographical concentration of stores selling similar products can be explained by consumers' imperfect information and their resulting need to search the market. A cluster of stores sustained by these forces is not necessarily located at the point that...