This paper analyzes, in a setup where only the control over actions is contractible, the rationale for delegation. An organization must take two decisions. The payoffs are affected by a random parameter, and only the agent knows its realization. If the principal delegates the control over the...

Einführung -- und Überblick -- Grundprobleme der Erfolgssteuerung -- Anreiz und Kontrolle als Instrumente der Entscheidungssteuerung -- Integration von Planung und Erfolgsrechnung -- Planung und Bewertung -- Messung und Bewertung von Periodenerfolgen -- Probleme der Ermittlung und Zurechnung...

Grundlagen der Gestaltung zielkonsistenter Anreizsysteme.- Gestaltung zielkonsistenter Anreizsysteme bei unbekannten Präferenzen und sicheren Projekten.- Gestaltung zielkonsistenter Anreizsysteme bei unbekannten Präferenzen und riskanten Projekten im Ein-Zeitpunkt-Fall sowie für mehrperiodige...

This work analyzes the problem of delegated decision-making within firms when investment projects are characterized by the possibility to make subsequent decisions after the initial investment decision has been made. By analyzing this question, the monograph combines and unifies two important...

The literature on public procurement pays great attention to the rules underlying tendering procedures as well as on the specification of the type of contract to be awarded. Less attention has been paid to the incompleteness of the contract; this issue is relevant in the public work sector...

An agent may manipulate information when transmitting it to the principal. A direct response to this problem is to verify the information. The paper explores a situation where the principal engages in information verification herself or alternatively delegates it to the agent. The paper finds...

This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring...

This article studies a principal-agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent. We show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the...

Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team׳s performance and therefore on their colleagues׳ productivity. We study the...

This paper explores a new role for venture capitalists, as knowledge intermediaries. A venture capital investor can communicate valuable knowledge to an entrepreneur, facilitating innovation. The venture capitalist can also communicate the entrepreneur's innovative knowledge to other portfolio...