We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.

We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical merger with a monopoly upstream will induce each downstream firm (inside and out of the merger) to deviate from the socially optimal location.

In this article we provide a theoretical analysis of the possible impact of trade and fragmentation on the skilled--unskilled wage gap in a small developing economy. In particular, we illustrate the possibility of a decline in the relative wage of the unskilled labor following an improvement in...

We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.

We construct a tractable model of an oligopolistic industry that allows us to capture the role of the vertical structure in the incentives for and implications of cross-border horizontal mergers. We show that vertical integration can increase the gains from cross-border mergers. We also...

We look at the implications of a cross-border merger upstream in a vertically related industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.