We analyze a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield payoffs after exponentially distributed random times. Free-riding causes an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with...

This paper studies optimal experimentation by a monopolist who faces an unknown demand curve subject to random changes, and who maximizes profits over an infinite horizon in continuous time. We show that there are two qualitatively very different regimes, determined by the discount rate and the...

The author solves for the reputational equilibrium in a class of linear quadratic Gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. This equilibrium is particularly simple to describe and tractable. There is imperfect monitoring but a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always...

Three designs of auctions with quality thresholds are considered. The quality threshold is not known with certainty by the bidders. In one scheme, quality plans submitted by potential bidders are evaluated first and price bids for only those plans that have been approved are invited. The second...