Although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant-date market price, in practice virtually all options are granted at the money. We offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle, by showing that pay-to-performance incentives for risk-averse...

We examined posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression symptom trajectories during ongoing exposure to political violence, seeking to identify psychologically resilient individuals and the factors that predict resilience. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a random sample of...

Little is known about the role of cognitive social capital among war-affected youth in low- and middle-income countries. We examined the longitudinal association between cognitive social capital and mental health (depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms), functioning, and...

This original collection examines the managerial and organizational implications of international terrorism and threats to security. When Islamic terrorists flew hijacked airplanes into the World Trade Center on 9/11, it changed much of the world forever. The number of deaths and the financial...

Why is the cost of resolving insurance company failures so high? Evidence in this paper suggests that the state insurance regulatory bodies in charge of the liquidation process turn over an average of only 33 cents for each $1.00 of pre-insolvency assets to the guaranty funds (the state agencies...

It is widely believed that the stock-market oriented US financial system forces corporate managers to behave myopically relative to their Japanese counterparts, who operate in a bank-based system. We hypothesize that if US firms are more myopic than Japanese firms, then episodes of financial...

What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...

We analyze and explore option fragility, the notion that option incentives are fragile due to their non-linear payoff structure. Option incentives become weaker as options fall underwater, leading to pressures to reprice options or restore incentives through additional grants of equity-based...

Detailed data about stock option contracts are used to measure and analyze the pay to performance incentives of executive stock options. Two main issues are addressed. The first is the pay to performance incentives created by the revaluation of stock option holdings. The findings suggest that if...