In a model of the world economy with identical countries and trade, Eichner and Pethig show that self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) may comprise up to 60% of all countries when the group of signatories curb domestic emissions via demand-side cap-and-trade policy....

We examine strategic incentives to subsidize green energy in a group of countries that operates an international carbon emissions trading scheme. In our model, green subsidies of either sign on top of emissions cap regulation reduce the welfare of the group of countries, but this may not hold...

In a multi-country model with mobile capital and global pollution this paper analyzes self-enforcing environmental agreements (IEAs) when the coalition formed by the signatory countries plays Nash. In accordance with a previous environmental literature we show that there exists a unique...

In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett, 1994; Rubio and Ulph, 2006), the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good...

We investigate the performance of a consumption-based carbon tax – implemented by full border carbon adjustment – as an instrument of unilateral climate damage mitigation in a two-period two-country general equilibrium model with a finite stock of fossil fuel. The implementation of that tax...

In an integrated dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy and the ecosystem humans and other species compete for land and prey biomass. Each submodel exhibits a price-driven competitive allocation mechanism, and the endogenously determined habitat is either openly accessible or privately...