We study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort (bid) where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution. These differences can either cause a player to drop out,...

For two independent principles of intergenerational equity, the implied discount rate equals the growth rate of real per capita income, say, 2%, thus falling right into the range suggested by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. To prove this, we develop a simple tool to evaluate small...

For an overlapping generations economy with varying life-cycle productivity, non-stationary endowments, continuous time starting at <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$-\infty $$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (hence allowing for full anticipation), constant-returns-to-scale production and <Emphasis Type="SmallCaps">ces utility, we fully characterise equilibria where output is higher...</emphasis></equationsource></inlineequation>

To extend the analysis of continuous-time general-equilibrium macro models we study 2 parameter variants Lp,q of the Lebesgue spaces, thus gaining separate control on the asymptotic behaviour (p) and the local behaviour (q): they behave w.r.t.  p like the spaces ℓp and w.r.t.  q like the...

Do greater potential gains from trade enhance or erode contracting institutions? In an anonymous exchange environment traders can sign a contract, hence agreeing to interact with the assigned partner, or wait till the next match. Any contract can be endorsed (for a payment) by the enforcement...

To understand reasons for possible failures of 'good' economic reforms, we consider an institution which is always successful in making the best public decision from the utilitarian perspective. We show it is bound to introduce inequality if costs of a reform are privately known: the losers can...