Showing 1 - 10 of 986
This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting …-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core …. Sufficient conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general and of the weak sequential core for the case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005050933
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375619
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515698
>Extension of the Nucleolus to Nontransferable Utility Games in Partition Function Form</li> <li>A Core Imputation with Variable …, and (iv) is always a point in the core of the game if the game is not null</li> <li>Uses methods from mathematical welfare …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115433
core. In this paper a new core concept, the interim sequential core (ISC), is proposed as a solution concept to … with the weak sequential core (WSC) of Habis and Herings (2011) but avoids the myopia implicit in the strong sequential … core (SSC). The three core notions are shown to be related by the subset inclusion ordering. The solution concept is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117122
AbstractThe following sections are included:An Overview of the ModelFCS GamesConsiderable Solutions in FCS GamesThe CoreDetermination of the Feasible Condition StructuresA Coalition for Production and SaleA Production-and-Sale Coalition in a Steady StateOptimality within the CoalitionBargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206347
AbstractThe following sections are included:PreliminariaTU Games in Partition Function FormSymmetrySuperadditivityEfficiencySuccessor FunctionNTU Games in Partition Function FormSuperior GamesExample: A Common-Property ResourceExample: A Cartel with Differentiated ProductsChapter Summary
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206456
AbstractThe following sections are included:Nontransferable Utility GamesZeuthen's SolutionNash Bargaining with Equal Bargaining PowerVariable-Threat BargainingNash Bargaining and Nash EquilibriumUnequal Bargaining PowerChapter Summary
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206505
AbstractThe following sections are included:A Brief Digression on the Noncooperative Stage of a Biform GameBargaining Power Biform GamesBiform Games and ExternalitiesSome Examples from the Recent LiteratureBrandenburger and Stuart (2007)Chatain and Zemsky (2007)Biform Games and Job MatchingA...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206510
AbstractThe following sections are included:ExcessThe NucleolusUniquenessCharacterizing the CoreThe Intermediate Case and Proper GamesExtended CoreSuperior GamesThe Example of a Common-Property ResourceThe Example of a CartelSummary and Conclusions
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206539