This paper considers the optimality of setting a secret reserve price in ascending auctions. Contrary to intuition, an ascending auction is no longer equivalent to a second price auction when the reserve price is secret. We determine the seller's optimal reserve price policy when the bidders'...

Abstract Certain health insurers offer a free choice of providers and an identical copayment regardless of the provider. Others build networks and use selective contracting and financial incentives to channel policyholders to contracted suppliers. In the case of unregulated prices, we compare...

[eng] Awarding Contracts According to the Best Bids in Economic Terms by Florence Naegelen . This article examines problems arising from the criterion for determining the best bids in tenders where the quality of products can be observed. The optimum procedure is one where bidders can provide...

[fre] La réglementation hospitalière : tarification par pathologie ou achat de soins ? par Michel Mougeot, Florence Naegelen . De nombreux pays ont mis en place des mécanismes incitatifs pour maîtriser des dépenses de santé. La tarification par pathologie repose sur une logique de...