-degenerate higher-order beliefs) can lead to conflict and drive its dynamics. We develop our analysis in the context of three classic … learning about the opponent's type, as well as the possibility of conflict spirals, traps, and cycles; and a deterrence model …. We relate these models to the empirical literature and to current and historical episodes of conflict …

We consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations. We show that whereas aggregate … conflict effort is always the same in evolutionary equilibrium, larger populations have greater individual subjective costs of … conflict effort. …

-theoretic principles may be particularly appropriate to the study of conflict. …

altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict …

Violent conflict destroys resources. It generates “destruction costs.” These costs have an important effect on … individuals’ decisions to cooperate or conflict. We develop two models of conflict: one in which conflict's destruction costs are … independent of individuals’ investments in “arms”—the tools of conflict—and another in which conflict's destruction costs depend …

context of a finitely repeated intergroup contest and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if … intergroup conflict and group rent-seeking. …

specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a "single enforcer punishment … following deviations by regular agent is that such actions, by reducing future cooperation, would decrease the amount of …

the predicted probability of cooperation by a subject with modal demographic characteristics from 67.9% to 80.6%. …