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Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

Newton, Jonathan; Angus, Simon D. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 172-187

interacts with every other member, but does not extend to more complex networks of interaction. Although it is in the interest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263589

Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities

Borm, Peter; Ju, Yuan; Wettstein, David - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 236-254

This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional … mechanism. This mechanism extends existing models of multilateral bargaining by allowing players a higher degree of freedom to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263578

Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games

Newton, Jonathan - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 364-381

An evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010582585

Coalition Formation

Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - Elsevier

approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255412

Chapter 5. Coalition Formation

Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 239-326). 2015

approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025454

Demonstration of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining

Navarro, Noemí; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 32 (2011) 5, pp. 762-772

We test the empirical effectiveness of two theoretical proposals to equilibrate bargaining power in bilateral … bargaining. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo & Wettstein …’ bargaining power by auctioning the role of the proposer in the first stage. We find that proposers learn how to send an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051344

Chapter 16. Formation of Networks and Coalitions

Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 729-779). 2011

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also covers models of group and network formation by farsighted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025687

Ranking friends

Feinberg, Yossi; Kets, Willemien - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107 (2014) PA, pp. 1-9

We investigate the scope for cooperation in a community engaged in repeated interactions. Players seek the help of … sustaining cooperation in equilibrium. It turns out that these are the profiles that spread the costs of helping equally. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011077020

Chapter 15. Learning in Networks

Goyal, Sanjeev - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 679-727). 2011

future choices. These considerations motivate a rich research programme on how social networks shape individual and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025688

Fairness and fairness for neighbors: The difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions

Béal, Sylvain; Rémila, Eric; Solal, Philippe - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 1, pp. 263-267

We replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) by fairness for neighbors in order to characterize the component-wise egalitarian solution. When a link is broken, fairness states that the two players incident to the link should be affected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580515