We analyze the effects of corporate governance reforms on interlocking directorship (ID), and we assess the relationship between interlocking directorships and company performance for the main Italian firms listed on the Italian stock exchange over 1998–2007. We use a unique dataset that...

We investigate how outside directors on supervisory boards influence innovative activities of the firms they advise and monitor. Based on panel data on the largest German companies, the econometric analysis shows a positive influence of external executives on innovative firm performance,...

Interlocking directorships are a pervasive element of the corporate landscape. Academic literature documents many examples of spreading business practices and strategic outcomes through this form of inter-organizational connectedness. Yet, the findings on the long debated relationship between...

This Paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups. The results suggest that there is poor...

We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than...

In this study we analyze the effect of latent managerial characteristics on corporate governance. We find that CEO and board chair fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in board size, board independence, and CEO-chair duality even after controlling for several firm...