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Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 247-270

An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of … general PSCs with nontrivial profit sharing than in an auction with only a one-time payment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049754

Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

Krähmer, Daniel - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 118-141

This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyersʼ valuations through an unobservable ex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042975

Mixed Bundling Auctions

Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single … objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667050

The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions

Grund, Christian; Guertler, Oliver - In: Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer … 228 (2008) 4, pp. 345-356

. Further, we challenge the recommendation that it is profitable for eBay sellers to let their auction end in the evening, when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790571

Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions

Zheng, Charles Z. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 648-664

A model of English auctions is proposed to incorporate the possibility of jump bidding. When two objects are sold separately via such auctions, bidders signal their willingness to pay via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the prices without relying on any central mediator....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588270

Auctions vs. negotiations in takeovers with initial stakes

Loyola, Gino - In: Finance Research Letters 9 (2012) 3, pp. 111-120

Takeover attempts from raiders with prior stakes in the target company (toeholds) are frequent in the market for corporate control. In this context, we propose a simple and realistic selling mechanism with an agenda of exclusive negotiations that discriminates against larger-toehold raiders....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010595312

The Dynamic Vickrey Auction

Mierendorff, Konrad - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 192-204

payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the Vickrey Auction. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719485

Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions

Hendricks, Ken; Porter, Robert H. - In: Handbook of industrial organization : volume 3, (pp. 2073-2143). 2007

We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024584

Chapter 9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design : Through the lens of Multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 477-515). 2015

Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory that aims to design games whose equilibria have desired properties such as achieving high efficiency or high revenue. Algorithmic mechanism design is a subfield that lies on the border of mechanism design and computer science and deals with mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450

Chapter 7. Advances in Auctions

Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shmuel - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 381-453). 2015

selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025452