Showing 1 - 10 of 6,615
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336
We introduce and analyze a new market design for trading financial assets. The design allows traders to directly trade any user-defined linear combination of assets. Orders for such portfolios are expressed as downward-sloping piecewise-linear demand curves with quantities as flows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250116
We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024584
. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single … objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667050
. Further, we challenge the recommendation that it is profitable for eBay sellers to let their auction end in the evening, when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790571
A model of English auctions is proposed to incorporate the possibility of jump bidding. When two objects are sold separately via such auctions, bidders signal their willingness to pay via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the prices without relying on any central mediator....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588270
Takeover attempts from raiders with prior stakes in the target company (toeholds) are frequent in the market for corporate control. In this context, we propose a simple and realistic selling mechanism with an agenda of exclusive negotiations that discriminates against larger-toehold raiders....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010595312
payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the Vickrey Auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719485
This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyersʼ valuations through an unobservable ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042975
An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of … general PSCs with nontrivial profit sharing than in an auction with only a one-time payment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049754