This paper studies how covenants are included in contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. I show that VCs hold covenanted veto rights even though they are shareholders who have access to other powerful governance solutions. Unlike bank loans and bonds, venture capital (VC)...

Using a large, new database of contractual provisions governing the allocation of cash flow rights in venture capital (VC) financings, we investigate how contract design is related to VC abilities to monitor and provide value-added services to the entrepreneur. We find that more experienced VCs,...

In 2002, the SEC launched enforcement actions against investors involved in PIPE (Private Investments in Public Equity) transactions. We describe the legal ramifications of this enforcement initiative, and document dramatic contemporaneous market-wide changes in the contractual structure of...

I study how often and why a serial founder receives financing for his new company from a venture capital (VC) firm that also invested in his previous company. One in 10 VC investments leads to a repeated relationship and one in three serial founders enters into a repeated relationship with any...

We hypothesize that because fast-growing young companies must raise money in private capital markets that contain significant financing frictions, the CEOs of such firms will be compensated for successful fundraising. Using a sample of 1585 private venture-backed U.S. firms, we find that the...

type="main" xml:id="ecin12088-abs-0001" <title type="main">Abstract</title> Real-world financial contracts are sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to understand their exact payoff consequences. We develop and test a theoretical model of a venture capitalist (VC) negotiating with an entrepreneur who may overweigh...

type="main" <p>Real-world financial contracts vary greatly in the combinations of cash flow contingency terms and control rights used. Extant theoretical work explains such variation by arguing that each investor finely tailors contracts to mitigate investment-specific incentive problems. We...</p>

type="main" <p>We examine how Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) contracts allocate contingent cash flow rights between investors and issuers and the role of placement agents in PIPE contract design. Issuers advised by expert agents agree to more investor-friendly terms than issuers advised...</p>

We document the role of entrepreneurial founder and venture capital (VC) partner co-ethnicity in shaping investment relationships. Co-ethnicity increases the likelihood that a VC firm invests in a company. Conditional on investment, co-ethnicity strengthens the degree of involvement by raising...