This paper provides a unified vision of a number of results that appeared in three separate streams of literature. The author emphasizes the strong parallelism between the results obtained in a number of papers that analyzed the relationships between price cap regulation, welfare maximization,...

Abstract We apply the idea of relational contracting to a simple problem of regulating a single-product monopoly with unverifiable (then ex ante not contractible) quality. We model the interaction between the regulator and the firm as an infinitely repeated game; we observe that there exist...

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative)...

We investigate the efficiency and effectiveness consequences of emissions trading taxation. A theoretical partial equilibrium model is developed, showing that permits taxation distorts the equilibrium price and abatement efforts. Potentially counterintuitive conclusions concerning the tax...

This paper provides a unified vision of a number of results that appeared in three separate streams of literature. The author emphasizes the strong parallelism between the results obtained in a number of papers that analyzed the relationships between price cap regulation, welfare maximization,...

We contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature on waste trade, with a focus on the secondhand market of plastic materials. To do this, we take two main steps: we first model a two-country setting with an exporting and an importing country, to derive testable predictions on how their...