This paper provides a unified vision of a number of results that appeared in three separate streams of literature. The author emphasizes the strong parallelism between the results obtained in a number of papers that analyzed the relationships between price cap regulation, welfare maximization,...

Abstract We apply the idea of relational contracting to a simple problem of regulating a single-product monopoly with unverifiable (then ex ante not contractible) quality. We model the interaction between the regulator and the firm as an infinitely repeated game; we observe that there exist...

This paper provides a unified vision of a number of results that appeared in three separate streams of literature. The author emphasizes the strong parallelism between the results obtained in a number of papers that analyzed the relationships between price cap regulation, welfare maximization,...

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative)...

We investigate the efficiency and effectiveness consequences of emissions trading taxation. A theoretical partial equilibrium model is developed, showing that permits taxation distorts the equilibrium price and abatement efforts. Potentially counterintuitive conclusions concerning the tax...

According to the EU water framework directive 2000/60, water tariffs should be based on the full cost recovery principle, including scarcity and external effects. To disregard these two aspects is not only conceptually misleading, as we try to show, but also leads to a wrong, distorted tariff....