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Chapter 25 Terrorism: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Sandler, Todd; Arce, Daniel G. - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 775-813). 2007

This chapter surveys the past applications of game theory to the study of terrorism. By capturing the strategic … interplay between terrorists and targeted governments, game theory is an appropriate methodology for investigating terrorism and … indicates novel directions for applying game theory to terrorism-related issues (e.g., cooperative collectives to strengthen …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024404

Chapter 20 Defense in a Globalized World: An Introduction

Sandler, Todd; Hartley, Keith - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 607-621). 2007

, terrorism, arms races, and military manpower); and chapters on topics that reflects the influence of globalization and new … threats (e.g., terrorism, trade and peace, and arms industries). Third, the chapter provides a brief overview of each chapter …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024409

Does Terrorism Work?

Gould, Eric D; Klor, Esteban F - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper examines whether terrorism is an effective tool to achieve political goals. By exploiting variation in … response to terror. Hence, terrorism appears to be an effective strategy in terms of shifting the entire Israeli political … landscape to the left. These findings may shed light on the causes underlying the spread of global terrorism in the last few …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458294

Who is the Enemy?

Epstein, Gil S; Gang, Ira - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251

Plata y Plomo : How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence

Pulejo, Massimo; Querubín Borrero, Pablo - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

Adequate wages are an important tool to shield public officials from special interests and corruption. But what is the equilibrium effect of higher wages in the presence of criminal pressure groups, who use both bribes and violence? By means of a regression discontinuity design, we show that an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014337819

Diffusion of behavior in dynamic networks

König, Michael D. - 2016 - This version: March 28, 2016

We analyze binary choice models in communication networks, in which both, the formation of links in the network as well as the action choices are endogenous. We provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium action choices and networks, where agents choose their strategies - actions and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444453

The n-player Hirshleifer contest

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2020

We characterize the equilibrium set of the n-player Hirshleifer contest with homogeneous valuations. A symmetric equilibrium always exists. It necessarily corresponds to multilateral peace for sufficient noise and uses finite-support randomized strategies otherwise. Asymmetric equilibria are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012267940

How Trump triumphed: multi-candidate primaries with buffoons

Castanheira, Micael; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes Josef - 2020

While people on all sides of the political spectrum were amazed that Donald Trump won the Republican nomination this paper demonstrates that Trump's victory was not a crazy event but rather the equilibrium outcome of a multi-candidate race where one candidate, the buffoon, is viewed as likely to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012299310

Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707

The impact of management incentives in intergroup contests

Eisenkopf, Gerald - In: European Economic Review 67 (2014) C, pp. 42-61

contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753312

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