We experimentally investigate the effects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining game …. Using a Baron–Ferejohn protocol, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to …

, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting. …

One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting … weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …

have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for …

members use different voting schemes to determine their commitment. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and … simple majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting public good provision level and social welfare. At first … sight, in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that a change in the voting scheme implemented in a …

We test a mechanism whereby groups are formed voluntarily, through the use of voting. These groups play a public …

referendum, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have …

ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process …. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and … recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary …

paper adopts an underlying legislative bargaining model proposed by Volden and Wiseman (2007) in which legislators with …