We consider a model of evolution with mutations as in Kandori et al. (1993) [Kandori, M., Mailath, G.J., Rob, R., 1993. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61, 29–56], where agents follow best-response decision rules as in Sandholm (1998) [Sandholm, W., 1998....

Due to the mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants, beliefs have been at the centre of attention of research into preferences for income redistribution. We elicit preferences for income redistribution through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland and...

In this paper, the amount of income redistribution in the United States, the European Union, and Switzerland is compared and empirically related to economic, political, and behavioral determinants elaborated in the literature. Lying in between the two poles, Switzerland provides unique evidence...

Over the last fifty years, game theory has evolved from a mathematical theory of optimal behaviour in stylized situations (“games”) to a general theory of human behaviour, be it actually observed or normatively desirable. Its scope includes both the mathematical modelling and analysis of...

A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius–coradius result for robust...

This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones....