We examine an incentive transfer scheme in an executive agency system when there are both marketable and nonmarketable public services. We show that because of the incentive transfer scheme, which contributes to the elimination of a government's budget deficit, social welfare is higher in the...

This paper examines a network owner's incentive for access innovation (i.e., the reduction of access cost) and compares two investment regimes (cooperation and noncooperation) under cost-based access pricing rules. When the access pricing rule is based on access cost, it brings about a spillover...

This paper examines the managerial incentives of oligopolistic firms with Cournot competition when they have an opportunity to form a coalition for cost reduction. The analysis shows that the introduction of managerial incentives reduces a firm’s incentive to form a coalition. Moreover, a firm...

We reexamine the properties of access regulation and an incumbent’s incentive for infrastructure investment under regulatory non-commitment and spillovers through access. The results show that when the degree of spillover is small, the incumbent’s strategic opportunity to invest in...

In our model, an entrant has two effective strategies for profit maximization: collaboration with incumbents and location choice. We analyze the effect of allowing an entrant the opportunity to collaborate with incumbents on its location choice. First, we show that when collaboration requires...

We empirically examine the effect of product market deregulation on wages. The difference-in-difference approach is used with wage data from three motor carrier industries (the taxi, bus and trucking industries) in Japan to obtain the following findings. First, deregulations in the 1990s and...