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Chapter 6. Merger Policy and Regulation in Media Industries
Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Sørgard, Lars - 2015
The aim of this chapter is to survey the media economics literature on mergers. In particular, we try to accentuate where the effects of mergers differ between conventional one-sided markets and two-sided media markets (though not all media mergers are within two-sided markets). We focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025247
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Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders
Kirkegaard, René - In: European Economic Review 64 (2013) C, pp. 98-110
In many contests, a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729778
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Effective Political Contests
Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504307
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Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests
Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366
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Contests with Ties
Cohen, Chen; Sela, Aner - In: Contributions to Theoretical Economics 7 (2007) 1, pp. 1398-1398
We study two-player all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We show that the … the prize for winning. The implications of this result are twofold. First, in symmetric one-stage contests, the designer …-third of the prize for winning. Second, in multi-stage contests, the designer should not limit the number of stages (tie …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005579657
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Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps
Kirkegaard, René - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 226-248
I examine a contest with identity-dependent rules in which contestants are privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous. A contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start. The former reduces the contestantʼs score by a fixed percentage; the latter is an additive bonus....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049730
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All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 130-134
We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117138
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All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that if the number of prizes is smaller than the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083545
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All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality
Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084454
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Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions
Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661485