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The fragility of deterrence in conflicts
Denter, Philipp; Sisak, Dana - 2013 - This version: October 2012
We study deterrence in sequential move conflicts, modeled as a contest. We bias the model in favor of peace by assuming that under complete information deterrence is achieved and peace prevails. We show that under incomplete information about states' types (resolve) the chances of deterrence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009791545
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Chapter 22 Economics of Conflict: An Overview
Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 649-709). 2007
In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conflict and appropriation. Allowing for the possibility of … conflict, which amounts to recognizing the possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced … technologies of conflict. A central objective of this research is to identify the effects of conflict on economic outcomes: the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024407
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Resource scarcity, effort allocation and environmental security: An agent-based theoretical approach
Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz; Parris, Brett W. - In: Economic Modelling 30 (2013) C, pp. 183-192
where adaptive agents can allocate a fraction of their effort to predatory behavior. By enriching a production and conflict … ranging from no statistically significant allocation changes to widespread conflict in the environment, depending on the … between resource scarcity and conflict is through changes in the distribution of resources rather than their overall …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608291
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Inefficient predation and political transitions
Dorsch, Michael T.; Maarek, Paul - In: European Journal of Political Economy 37 (2015) C, pp. 37-48
This paper presents a theory of endogenous economic institutions in non-democracies, where political accountability is enforced through the threat of revolution. We consider a dynamic game between an elite ruling class and a disenfranchised working class, in which workers have imperfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011209608
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Endogenous Property Rights
Sonin, Konstantin; Diermeier, Daniel; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number of veto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821832
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Do politicians shirk when reelection is certain? Evidence from the German parliament
Bernecker, Andreas - In: European Journal of Political Economy 36 (2014) C, pp. 55-70
Does stiffer electoral competition reduce political shirking? For a micro-analysis of this question, I construct a new data set spanning the years 2005 to 2012 covering biographical and political information about German Members of Parliament (MPs), including their attendance rates in voting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939863
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Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition
Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Ok, Efe A; Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791655
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Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
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Endogenous Lobbying
Felli, Leonardo; Merlo, Antonio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789151
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On the Political Economy of Labour Market Flexibility
Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993
This paper starts from the observation that despite their very high levels of unemployment, major European countries have devoted few resources to reducing it. This suggests that there is little political concern about high unemployment. I develop a model where the government tries to increase...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498035