type="main" xml:lang="en" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>Applying a framework of perfect competition under uncertainty, we contribute to the discussion of whether or not ad valorem taxes and specific taxes are equivalent. While this equivalence holds without price uncertainty, we show that ad valorem taxes and...</p>

Amartya Sen (1970) has shown that three natural desiderata for social choice rules are inconsistent: universal domain, respect for unanimity, and respect for some minimal rights - which can be interpreted as either expert rights or liberal rights. Dietrich and List (2008) have generalised this...

This paper builds on a recent proposal for microeconomic foundations for "representative agents". Herzberg [Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 46, no. 6, 1115-1124 (2010)] constructed a representative utility function for infinite-dimensional social decision problems and since the decision...

We prove that in smooth Markovian continuous-time economies with potentially complete asset markets, Radner equilibria with endogenously complete markets exist.

For a continuous-time financial market with a single agent, we establish equilibrium pricing formulae under the assumption that the dividends follow an exponential Lévy process. The agent is allowed to consume a lump at the terminal date; before that, only flow consumption is allowed. The...

This addendum fills a minor gap in the key lemma of a paper by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [Lauwers, L., Van Liedekerke, L., 1995. J. Math. Econ. 24 (3), 217-237].

The theory of Boolean algebras can be fruitfully applied to judgment aggregation: assuming universality, systematicity and a sufficiently rich agenda, there is a correspondence between (i) non-trivial deductively closed judgment aggregators and (ii) Boolean algebra homomorphisms defined on the...

A non-Archimedean utility representation theorem for independent and transitive preference orderings that are partially continuous on some convex subset and satisfy an axiom of incommensurable preference for elements outside that subset is proven. For complete preference orderings, the theorem...