Previous work on moral-hazard problems has shown that, under certain conditions, bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk-neutral workers. In our paper we demonstrate that, if a firm employs at least two workers, it may further benefit from combining worker compensation via...

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the...

Recently, various approximate design problems for low-degree trigonometric regression models on a partial circle have been solved. In this paper we consider approximate and exact optimal design problems for first-order trigonometric regression models without intercept on a partial circle. We...

It is shown that, in the case of polynomial regression, there exist experimental designs x, y such that y is not better than x in the sense of the G-criterion although it is uniformly better than x. Furthermore, a simple proof of Jung's theorem on G-optimal exact designs for straight-line...

Exact n-point designs are given which are D-optimum for a simple multiresponse model, where the individual response variables can be represented by first-order and second-order models. The present results complement recent findings by Krafft and Schaefer, who obtained D-optimum n-point designs...