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A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - In: Research Policy 43 (2014) 1, pp. 179-189

’ financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information … procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729634

Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 388-402

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049835

Budget feasible procurement auctions

Anari, Nima; Goel, Gagan; Nikzad, Afshin - In: Operations research 66 (2018) 3, pp. 637-652

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011884264

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336

Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

Condorelli, Daniele - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 582-591

A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719488

Chapter 9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design : Through the lens of Multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 477-515). 2015

addressing it by focusing on a single simple problem: multiunit auctions. A variety of issues will be discussed: representation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450

Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement

Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent - In: Journal of economic theory 171 (2017), pp. 35-63

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011776993

First-best collusion without communication

Rachmilevitch, Shiran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 224-230

I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049799

Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products

Saban, Daniela; Weintraub, Gabriel - In: Operations research 69 (2021) 3, pp. 795-820

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012546873

When to deploy test auctions in sourcing

Beil, Damian R.; Chen, Qi; Duenyas, Izak; See, Brendan D. - In: Manufacturing & service operations management : M & SOM 20 (2018) 2, pp. 232-248

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011876684

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