This chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory...

Social-ecological systems are complex adaptive systems where social and biophysical agents are interacting at multiple temporal and spatial scales. The main challenge for the study of governance of social-ecological systems is improving our understanding of the conditions under which cooperative...

We consider a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government will then find it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its...

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about...

We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...

HOLM [1995] claims that the prisoners' dilemma story is dubious: Each prisoner may confess even when innocent. However, this apparent failing can be remedied. The story is dubious rather because it is already institution-bound (the trust which binds the prisoners) and, therefore, its range is...

This Paper considers the efficiency and convergence properties of dynamic processes of social and economic interactions, such as exchange economies, multilateral negotiations, merger and divestiture transactions, or legislative bargaining. The key general feature of the economy is that agents...

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the "proposer commitment" procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the...

We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model, where the players can partition themselves...