This paper is about the diffusion of cooperation in an infinite population of networked individuals repeatedly playing a Prisoner's Dilemma. We formulate conditions on payoffs and network structure such that, starting from an initial seed group, imitative learning results in the overall adoption...

Based on French data describing the characteristics of entrepreneurs and their projects, this article studies the differences between the determinants of survival for innovative and non-innovative micro-enterprises. We show that the survival of innovative and non-innovative enterprises is linked...

We examine a society in which individuals gain utility from income and social approbation. Approbation is given to an unobservable trait, signalled through social mobility. Two environments are studied: in one players care for absolute approbation; in the other relative approbation matters. In...

The dynamics of technological adoption are studied in a Markovian industry in which competing firms interact through price and network externalities. Technological complementarities alter firms productivities, entailing permanent fluctuations in output and equilibrium price. The limit...

This paper provides an analysis of compatibility in a sequential game in which firms first choose whether they supply compatible products and then set the price which they charge. The equilibrium compatibility configuration is the outcome of a trade-off between consumers' valuation of...

In this paper, we model the formation of innovation networks as they emerge from bilateral decisions. In contrast to much of the literature, here firms only consider knowledge production, and not network issues, when deciding on partners. Thus, we focus attention on the effects of the knowledge...