For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate shares according to some lexicographic preference relation. A computational procedure is provided. Our results relate to those of Tijs et al. (2011).

We introduce a matching model in which agents engage in joint ventures via multilateral contracts. This approach allows us to consider production complementarities previously outside the scope of matching theory. We show analogues of the first and second welfare theorems and, when agents'...

Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems try to connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points in space and the cost of using an edge is fixed. We introduce a new cost sharing solution that always selects a point in the core and that is more responsive to...

We ask how to share the cost of finitely many public goods (items) among users with different needs: some smaller subsets of items are enough to serve the needs of each user, yet the cost of all items must be covered, even if this entails inefficiently paying for redundant items. Typical...

We study the long-run emergence of behavioral patterns in dynamic complex networks. Individuals can display two kinds of behavior: G ("good" ) or B ("bad" ). We assume that the exposure of a G agent to bad behavior on the part of peers/neighbors triggers her own switch to B behavior, but only...

Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sorting. I show how to use equilibrium data on who matches with whom for semiparametric estimation of match production functions in many-to-many, two-sided matching games with transferable utility....

In an economic or social situation where agents have to group in order to achieve common goals, how can we calculate the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU-game and a network describing the economic structure, we...

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also covers models of group and network formation by farsighted...

We demonstrate that personal connections amongst US politicians have a significant impact on Senate voting behavior. Networks based on alumni connections between politicians are consistent predictors of voting behavior. We estimate sharp measures that control for common characteristics of the...

This paper studies the effect of social learning on political outcomes in a model of informative campaign advertising. Voters' communication network affects parties' incentives to disclose political information, voters' learning about candidates running for office, and polarization of the...