In this paper we propose a new way to formulate optimal policy based on a quadratic intertemporal welfare function where the dynamic constraint is based on a VAR model of the economy which we call the PVAR method. We argue that the VAR under control should not be derived simply by replacing the...

Using group and majorization theory, we explore what can be established about allocation of funds among assets when asymmetries in the returns vector are carefully controlled. The key insight is that preferences over allocations can be partially ordered via majorized convex hulls that have been...

This paper develops and demonstrates a combined set of models to capture regional development decision processes. The results of the models are then integrated along with other socio-political factors within a policy relevant decision methodology framework. The Haynes and Dinc (1997) extension...

This paper studies the implications for the optimal policy of introducing an exogenous minimum wage into a standard public finance model. I present a dynamic general equilibrium model with a Ramsey planner deciding about public spending, labor income taxes and debt. I find that for sufficiently...

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No abstract received.

The paper deals with standard mathematical models for nonlinear affine control systems with two (vector-valued) inputs u (=control) and w (unknown except for a bound for the sup-norm). Interpretation of this scenario and its wide range of applications (in control and differential game theory):...

Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under...

In many share problems there is an a priori given a natural set of possible divisions to solve the sharing problem. Cooperative games related to such share sets are introduced, which may be helpful in solving share problems. Relations between properties of share sets and properties of games are...

Under dynamic cooperation a player may use 'irrational' acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the...