Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers...

Money managers behave strategically when competing for fund flows within relatively small groups. We study strategic interaction between two risk-averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium dynamic investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian...

Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers...

type="main" <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>This paper analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers who compete for fund flows. We study such interaction between two risk-averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium...</p>

There is a simple but overlooked way of capturing the wealth effect under CARA utility via making the absolute-risk aversion parameter wealth-dependent. We implement this approach in the asymmetric information setting of Verrecchia (1982), and compare it with the alternative approach of changing...