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Teams in a public goods experiment with punishment

Auerswald, Heike; Schmidt, Carsten; Thum, Marcel; … - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 72 (2018), pp. 28-39

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012038126

Designing the new European Union

Berger, Helge (contributor); Moutos, Thomas (contributor) - 2007 - 1st ed

This volume is based on papers delivered at the second CESifo-Delphi Conferences (Munich, November 2003, and Delphi …, June 2004), which are jointly organized by CESifo and the Department of International and European Economic Studies of the … Athens University of Economics and Business. The CESifo-Delphi Conferences are organized every two years and involve a two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012049763

CESifo Conference in Law and Economics : Munich, May 2010

Deffains, Bruno (contributor) - CESifo GmbH - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490265

Overworked? On the relationship between workload and health worker performance

Mæstad, Ottar; Torsvik, Gaute; Aakvik, Arild - In: Journal of Health Economics 29 (2010) 5, pp. 686-698

The shortage of health workers in many low-income countries poses a threat to the quality of health services. When the number of patients per health worker grows sufficiently high, there will be insufficient time to diagnose and treat all patients adequately. This paper tests the hypothesis that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008863833

Testing guilt aversion

Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Tjøtta, Sigve; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010) 1, pp. 95-107

Guilt averse individuals experience a utility loss if they believe they let someone down. For example, generosity depends on what the donor believes that the recipient expects to receive. We measure guilt aversion in three separate experiments: a dictator game experiment, a complete information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565487

Discretion and Incentives in Organizations.

Olsen, Trond E; Torsvik, Gaute - In: Journal of Labor Economics 18 (2000) 3, pp. 377-404

We analyze the link between workers' discretion and incentives in an organisation that lasts for several periods. In a long-lasting affiliation, it is possible for the principal to learn and update her beliefs about essential characteristics associated with either the job or the agent. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005781415

Policy Focus: Networks, middlemen and other (urban) labour market mysteries

Iversen, Vegard; Torsvik, Gaute - In: Indian Growth and Development Review 3 (2010) April, pp. 62-80

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the roles of social networks and intermediares in recruitment and as instruments to control the workforce in lower end urban labour markets in developing countries. The existing literature favours explanations where networks and middlemen are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008464922

Limited intertemporal commitment and job design

Meyer, Margaret A.; Olsen, Trond E.; Torsvik, Gaute - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 31 (1996) 3, pp. 401-417

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136024

Dynamic incentives and term limits in bureaucracy regulation

Konrad, Kai A.; Torsvik, Gaute - In: European Journal of Political Economy 13 (1997) 2, pp. 261-279

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005331626

Intertemporal common agency and organizational design: How much decentralization?

Olsen, Trond E.; Torsvik, Gaute - In: European Economic Review 39 (1995) 7, pp. 1405-1428

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005322852