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Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - In: Economics Letters 117 (2012) 1, pp. 45-48

We investigate parochial altruism, the combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility, in an experimental conflict game preceded by a prisoner’s dilemma. Our data are consistent with parochial altruism, but cannot be explained by in-group pro-sociality or out-group hostility alone.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580479

Group identities in conflicts

Kolmar, Martin; Wagener, Andreas - In: Homo oeconomicus : HOE ; journal of behavioral and … 36 (2019) 3/4, pp. 165-192

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012225772

Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation : the average vote example

Renault, Régis; Trannoy, Alain - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 497-513

The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to construct approximations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505651

Theory of regional stability as a public good: Examples from Southern Africa

Nota, Fungisai - In: Economics of Peace and Security Journal 4 (2009) 2, pp. 6-14

The article examines the interaction of countries in the same region when making efforts to achieve stability. The leader in regional initiatives that foster stability is likely to be the most vulnerable member of the region because in the event of regional instability, the leader member will...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941324

Do Immigrants and Their Children Free Ride More Than Natives?

Osili, Una Okonkwo; Xie, Jia - In: American Economic Review 99 (2009) 2, pp. 28-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999839

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134

Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts

Kolmar, Martin; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 89 (2013) C, pp. 9-22

This paper starts from the observation that in public-goods group contests, group impact can in general not be additively decomposed into some sum (of functions) of individual efforts. We use a CES-impact function to identify the main channels of influence of the elasticity of substitution on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664299

Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - In: American Economic Review 100 (2010) 1, pp. 420-47

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008622186

The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 73-85

We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the otherʼs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049764

Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change

El-Sayed, Abeer; Rubio, Santiago J. - In: Resource and Energy Economics 38 (2014) C, pp. 168-180

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international … cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to … cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076794

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