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Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion
Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654
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Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care
Rud Kristensen, Søren; Siciliani, Luigi; Sutton, Matt - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
The increased availability of process measures implies that quality of care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable quality is well-described in the incentive-design literature. We seek to narrow the large gap between actual price-setting behaviour in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084045
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Inspection Technology, Detection and Compliance: Evidence from Florida Restaurant Inspections
Lee, Jungmin; Jin, Ginger Zhe - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
In this article, we show that a small innovation in inspection technology can make substantial differences in inspection outcomes. For restaurant hygiene inspections, the state of Florida has introduced a handheld electronic device, the portable digital assistant (PDA), which reminds inspectors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951300
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Multitasking, Quality and Pay for Performance
Kaarboe, Oddvar Martin; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791404
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Paying for Performance with Altruistic or Motivated Providers
Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser (a principal) and a provider (an agent). We assume that: a) providers differ in efficiency and there are two types of provider; b) efficiency is private information (adverse selection); c) providers are partially altruistic or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661600
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Upcoding and Optimal Auditing in Health Care (or The economics of DRG creep)
Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
higher price under 'no commitment'. Nevertheless, quality and manipulation remain at lower levels, whereas auditing is more … commit to a given audit policy (commitment); b) the purchaser cannot commit to a given audit policy (no commitment). If … audit is higher under the 'commitment' scenario than under the 'no commitment' one; also, under 'commitment', the degree of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661727
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Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We explore the role of firms in insuring risk-averse workers. As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are sufficiently risk averse and the firm can base incentive payments on good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667043
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Chapter 31 Prevention
Kenkel, Donald S. - In: Handbook of health economics : volume 1, part B, (pp. 1675-1720). 2000
Prevention ranges from medical decisions such as vaccinations and clinical preventive services delivered during periodic health examinations to private health lifestyle decisions such as regular exercise and non-smoking. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of economic issues that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024174
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Chapter 31 Health care and the public sector
Cutler, David M. - In: Handbook of public economics : volume 4, (pp. 2143-2243). 2002
This chapter summarizes the many aspects of public policy for health care. I first consider government policy affecting individual behaviors. Government intervention to change individual actions such as smoking and drinking is frequently justified on externality grounds. External costs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024858
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Medicare Reimbursements and Shortages of Sterile Injectable Pharmaceuticals
Yurukoglu, Ali - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012
This paper investigates the rise in shortages of sterile injectable pharmaceutical drugs in the US. I examine a policy change in 2005 that differentially reduced Medicare Part B payments for pharmaceuticals. Drugs whose payments dropped more due to the policy change have had greater increases in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011227913