We examine the implications of changes in the skill distribution on the equilibrium matching process and the job finding rate, using a directed search approach. Worker abilities are selected from a distribution while firms face heterogeneous entry costs and direct their job offers to workers. We...

Two thirds of US unemployment volatility is due to fluctuations in workers' job finding rate. In search and matching models, aggregate productivity shocks generate such fluctuations: through firms recruiting effort, they affect the rate at which workers and firms come into contact....

We analyse the coordination problem in the labour market by endogenizing the matching function and the wage share. Each firm posts a wage to maximize the expected profit, anticipating how the wage affects the expected number of applicants. In equilibrium workers apply to firms with mixed...

This Paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. The nature of the inefficiency depends, however, on the balance between the two key...

I estimate a search-and-bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations, asset prices and welfare, and to quantify the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade. Using business-aircraft data, I find that, relative to the...

I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller’s discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.

This paper aims to provide a simple method for measuring the price dispersion in the housing market controlling for the differences in attributes or qualities of the residential real estate units. Precisely, the paper proposes an extended hedonic pricing model which incorporates standard market...

This paper studies a dynamic bargaining model with informational externalities between bargaining pairs. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the price they will pay for their work while its cost is agents' private information and correlated between them. The principals...

In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an...