We analyse the coordination problem in the labour market by endogenizing the matching function and the wage share. Each firm posts a wage to maximize the expected profit, anticipating how the wage affects the expected number of applicants. In equilibrium workers apply to firms with mixed...

Two thirds of US unemployment volatility is due to fluctuations in workers' job finding rate. In search and matching models, aggregate productivity shocks generate such fluctuations: through firms recruiting effort, they affect the rate at which workers and firms come into contact....

We examine the implications of changes in the skill distribution on the equilibrium matching process and the job finding rate, using a directed search approach. Worker abilities are selected from a distribution while firms face heterogeneous entry costs and direct their job offers to workers. We...

This Paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. The nature of the inefficiency depends, however, on the balance between the two key...

We analyze a two-sided search model in which we assume utility is not perfectly transferable. Except for this assumption the model is standard, yet it generates results that are quite different from those obtained in models with transferable utility. In particular, the model has multiple...

In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this Paper shows that when matching is...

We utilize a random-matching model to examine the relationships between market frictions and international trade. In our setting, an individual may choose to search abroad where she may have a cost advantage, but is less likely to meet potential trading partners, owing to higher market...

We endogenize the trade mechanism in a search economy with many homogenous sellers and many heterogeneous buyers of unobservable type. We study how heterogeneity and the traders' continuation values -- which are endogenous -- influence the sellers' choice of trade mechanism. Sellers trade off...