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Strategic ignorance in ultimatum bargaining
Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 92 (2013) C, pp. 104-115
In his classic article “An Essay on Bargaining” Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength … rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining experiment where … proposer. In additional treatments we investigate bargaining situations where the proposer can deliberately remain ignorant. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048133
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Bargaining with revoking costs
Dutta, Rohan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 144-153
A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie …. Higher cost functions are shown to improve bargaining power. The limit equilibrium prediction of the model, as the cost … Bargaining Solution of Kalai (1977). …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049846
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Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study
Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 495-514
We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game …, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588271
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Dynamics in near-potential games
Candogan, Ozan; Ozdaglar, Asuman; Parrilo, Pablo A. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 66-90
We consider discrete-time learning dynamics in finite strategic form games, and show that games that are close to a potential game inherit many of the dynamical properties of potential games. We first study the evolution of the sequence of pure strategy profiles under better/best response...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049857
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Evolution of theories of mind
Mohlin, Erik - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 299-318
This paper studies the evolution of peoplesʼ models of how other people think – their theories of mind. This is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049877
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Coalition Formation
Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - Elsevier
approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255412
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Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 507-516
characterized by a minmax problem involving efficient equilibrium payoffs that are above the bargaining frontier, which is possible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049845
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Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders
Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R; Turban, Sébastien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084134
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Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
Newton, Jonathan - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 364-381
An evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010582585
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Dynamic legislative policy making
Duggan, John; Kalandrakis, Tasos - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 1653-1688
We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594322