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A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality

Ehlers, Lars H. - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 447-452

We consider private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule satisfying omega-continuity, no-envy, and one-sided resource-monotonicity. This result strengthens a characterization of the uniform rule due to Thomson (Soc Choice Welf...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505655

Freedom of choice : John Stuart Mill and the tree of life

Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel A.; … - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 209-226

This essay deals with the notion and content of freedom of choice proposing a new set up and a new family of measures … some ideas of John StuartMill, we propose that freedom of choice has to be understood not in a single stage of choice, but … this new framework, we propose a set of axioms that imply the following family of measures of lifetime's freedom of choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506417

Chapter Fifteen. Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures

Hammond, Peter J. - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 2, (pp. 47-151). 2011

A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals’ preferences concern only their own personal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025193

Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism

Güth, Werner - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 389-395

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness, we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116861

Alternative derivation of the leximin principle

Mori, Osamu - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 1, pp. 157-159

This note provides an alternative derivation of the leximin principle using the framework of Harsanyi’s (1953) equi-probability model. We demonstrate that the leximin principle is concluded if and only if the preference ordering of the impartial observer obeys strong monotonicity and complete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784997

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Bochet, Olivier; Gordon, Sidartha - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 52-67

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049862

Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707

Collective rationality and monotone path division rules

Stovall, John E. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) C, pp. 1-24

We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on division rules for the conflicting claims problem. With the addition of Consistency and Resource Monotonicity, this characterizes a family of rules which can be described in three different but intuitive ways. First, a rule is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076672

Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

Bochet, Olivier; İlkılıç, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2, pp. 535-562

Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042928

Equally-distributed equivalent utility, ex post egalitarianism and utilitarianism

Grant, Simon; Kajii, Atsushi; Polak, Ben; Safra, Zvi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 4, pp. 1545-1571

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyiʼs impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042954