This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social ties in a community enhance borrowers’ incentives to exert effort, a profit-maximizing financier chooses a group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have...

This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending. By doing so, we shed light on an apparent shift away from joint liability lending towards individual liability lending by some microfinance institutions First we show that individual lending...

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major...

A structural analysis of credit contract theory -- The treatment of credit contract theory in the literature -- A standardisation of credit contract theory -- Joint liability and its potential to cause adverse selection instead of resolving it -- The perverse effect of joint liability and its...