The “Economic Metronome” (EM) is a term, used for the mathematical formula of a set of fundamental interrelations of key importance for the monetary-value expression among: the main factors of economical activity of any range; their productivity; the primary proportions in production,...

İlgi alanının sınırlarının dışıyla ilgisini kesmiş neoklasik iktisadın iktisadi düşünce üzerindeki belirleyiciliğini göz önüne aldığımızda iktisadi düşünceye dair yeni düşünceler geliştirme yolunda komşu sosyal bilim disiplinlerinin kaynaşmasının ne denli...

The economic metronome (IM) is a term for a mathematical formula of a set of fundamental interrelations of a key importance for the value-monetary expression among: the main factors of business activity of any kind; their productivity; the primary proportions in production, distribution, exchange...

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. I show that the principal explains her evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be...

The marginal cost of effort often increases as effort is exerted. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, dynamically increasing costs create information asymmetry. This paper characterizes the optimal contract and helps explain the popular yet thus far puzzling use of non-linear incentives, for...

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed...

Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."The paper "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821

This paper analyzes the impact of agents' risk aversion and other agency parameters on optimal bias in the performance measures used for incentive contracts. Prior research has shown that the limited liability of the agent results in a demand for accounting systems that are stringent compared to...

This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial compensation when hedging instruments serve as a double-edged sword in that they may be used for both corporate hedging and earnings management. On the one hand, financial vehicles can offer...