İlgi alanının sınırlarının dışıyla ilgisini kesmiş neoklasik iktisadın iktisadi düşünce üzerindeki belirleyiciliğini göz önüne aldığımızda iktisadi düşünceye dair yeni düşünceler geliştirme yolunda komşu sosyal bilim disiplinlerinin kaynaşmasının ne denli...

The “Economic Metronome” (EM) is a term, used for the mathematical formula of a set of fundamental interrelations of key importance for the monetary-value expression among: the main factors of economical activity of any range; their productivity; the primary proportions in production,...

The economic metronome (IM) is a term for a mathematical formula of a set of fundamental interrelations of a key importance for the value-monetary expression among: the main factors of business activity of any kind; their productivity; the primary proportions in production, distribution, exchange...

Contractual execution generates hard information, available to the contracting parties, even when contracts are secretly executed. Building on this simple observation, the paper shows that incomplete contracts can be preferred to complete contracts. This is because (i) execution of incomplete...

This review provides a critical survey of psychology-and-economics ("behavioral-economics") research in contract theory. First, I introduce the theories of individual decision making most frequently used in behavioral contract theory, and formally illustrate some of their implications in...

We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do: she knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal demands robustness, evaluating possible contracts by their worst-case performance,...

This paper explores a new role for venture capitalists, as knowledge intermediaries. A venture capital investor can communicate valuable knowledge to an entrepreneur, facilitating innovation. The venture capitalist can also communicate the entrepreneur's innovative knowledge to other portfolio...

We study a contract design setting in which the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate previous contract agreements. In particular, we characterize the outcome functions that are implementable for an uninformed principal and an informed agent if, having observed the agent's...

In a class of informed principal problems with common values, we define iteratively a particular allocation which we call the assured allocation. It is comparatively easy to calculate and straightforward to interpret. It always exists, is unique and continuous in the priors. It is undominated,...

This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...