The economic metronome (IM) is a term for a mathematical formula of a set of fundamental interrelations of a key importance for the value-monetary expression among: the main factors of business activity of any kind; their productivity; the primary proportions in production, distribution, exchange...

The “Economic Metronome” (EM) is a term, used for the mathematical formula of a set of fundamental interrelations of key importance for the monetary-value expression among: the main factors of economical activity of any range; their productivity; the primary proportions in production,...

İlgi alanının sınırlarının dışıyla ilgisini kesmiş neoklasik iktisadın iktisadi düşünce üzerindeki belirleyiciliğini göz önüne aldığımızda iktisadi düşünceye dair yeni düşünceler geliştirme yolunda komşu sosyal bilim disiplinlerinin kaynaşmasının ne denli...

We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms' dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the...

A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the principal trades off ex post efficiency in the bad state of nature against a larger profit in the good state of nature. We report about an experiment with 508 participants designed to...

This paper considers the joint optimal design of CEOs' on-the-job compensation and severance pay in a general optimal contracting framework. We obtain a novel argument for high-powered, non-linear CEO compensation such as bonus schemes and option grants that is different from existing arguments...

In the standard property rights approach to the theory of the firm, joint ownership cannot be optimal, because it induces smaller investments in human capital than ownership by a single party. This result holds under the assumption that bargaining is always ex post efficient due to symmetric...

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated...

What are the effects of restricting bonded labor clauses in tenancy or debt contracts? While such restrictions reduce agents' ability to credibly commit ex ante to repay principals in states where they default on their financial obligations, they also generate a pecuniary externality on other...

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...