The pre-nucleolus is a popular egalitarian solution concept for cost-sharing games. A drawback of this concept is that an associated cost allocation often cannot be calculated in polynomial time. Therefore, it would be convenient to know whether the pre-nucleolus of a particular game coincides...

The literature on game theory and fisheries is reviewed, beginning with the initial papers from the late 1970s on cooperative and noncooperative games. Later developments considered repeated games and trigger strategies as well as the stability of coalitions. It is argued that the latter...

This chapter surveys some of the literature in game theory that has emerged from Shapley's seminal paper on the Value. The survey includes both contributions which offer different interpretations of the Shapley value as well as several different ways to characterize the value axiomatically. The...

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the...

This paper examines how conservation decisions are affected by environmental degradation. Donations to an environmental NGO and participation in actual conservation activities capture individual preferences for environmental conservation. Environmental degradation is measured both through...

Although simple games are very useful in modeling decision-making bodies, they allow each voter only two choices: to support or oppose a measure. This restriction ignores that voters often can abstain from voting, which is effectively different from the other two options. Following the approach...

This paper starts from a classical fair division situation of allocating an object among a set of agents. The problem is studied from both a cooperative and a bankruptcy point of view, analyzing the fairness properties of the proposed solutions.

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics,...

AbstractThe following sections are included:An Overview of the ModelFCS GamesConsiderable Solutions in FCS GamesThe CoreDetermination of the Feasible Condition StructuresA Coalition for Production and SaleA Production-and-Sale Coalition in a Steady StateOptimality within the CoalitionBargaining...