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Internal labor markets and worker rents
Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 2, pp. 491-509
We show that establishing an internal labor market by offering combined contracts across hierarchy levels strictly dominates external recruitment when workers are homogeneous. The reason is that only an internal labor market can exploit higher tier rents for incentive provision on lower tiers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048204
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Performance responses to competition across skill-levels in rank order tournaments : field evidence and implications for tournament design
Boudreau, Kevin J.; Helfat, Constance E.; Lakhani, Karim R. - 2013
Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010192352
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How should teams be formed and managed? : how teams are chosen and how they are compensated can determine how successfully they solve problems and benefit the firm
Ōwan, Hideo - 2014
The keys to effective teamwork in firms are (1) carefully designed team-formation policies that take into account what level of diversity of skills, knowledge, and demographics is desirable and (2) balanced team-based incentives. Employers need to choose policies that maximize the gains from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420496
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Social norms and firms’ discriminatory pay-setting
Janssen, Simon; Tuor Sartore, Simone N.; … - 2012
This study analyzes the relationship between discriminatory social attitudes and the variation of within-firm pay gaps by combining data on regional votes on gender equality laws with a data set of multi-establishments firms and their workers. The data set allows us for the first time to study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751933
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HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS
KRÄKEL, MATTHIAS - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 02, pp. 211-228
A two-stage, two-person tournament is discussed, in which each player can influence the other one at the first stage by choosing help, sabotage or no action. At the second stage, the players choose effort to win the tournament. Helping and sabotaging have two effects — they influence the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081039
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Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives
Jones, Michael D. - In: Economics of Education Review 37 (2013) C, pp. 148-164
Over the last decade many districts implemented performance pay incentives to reward teachers for improving student achievement. Economic theory suggests that these programs could alter teacher work effort, cooperation, and retention. Because teachers can choose to work in a performance pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729868
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Estimating Management Practice Complementarity between Decentralization and Performance Pay
Hong, Bryan; Kueng, Lorenz; Yang, Mu-Jeung - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2015
The existence of complementarity across management practices has been proposed as one potential explanation for the persistence of firm-level productivity differences. However, thus far no conclusive population-level tests of the complementary joint adoption of management practices have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123618
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Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509
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When higher prizes lead to lower efforts—The impact of favoritism in tournaments
Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 188-191
We investigate the relationship between tournament prices and effort choices in the presence of favoritism. High tournament prizes can decrease agents’ effort supply when the choice of the winner is not perfectly objective but affected to some extent by personal preferences of an evaluator.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041567
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Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the … productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely … incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083724