Is order-flow an important component of private information possessed by traders in government securities markets? Utilizing a detailed data set on Government of Canada securities auctions, we argue that the answer is yes. Direct participation in these auctions is limited to government...

We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or to the bottom.

In this paper we show that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous impact on capital accumulation. We further show that it is also responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that otherwise would be characterized by unique equilibria. These results explain the...

Current practice largely follows restrictive approaches to market risk measurement, such as historical simulation or RiskMetrics. In contrast, we propose flexible methods that exploit recent developments in financial econometrics and are likely to produce more accurate risk assessments, treating...

In this paper, we generalize the approach of Hinz & Wilhelm (2006), Pricing flow commodity derivatives using fixed income market techniques. International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 9, 1299–1321, replacing in the dynamics of the asset prices the Brownian motion by a more...

This paper examines the impact of the introduction of electricity futures on the spot-price volatility of the French (Powernext) and German (EEX) electricity markets, as well as the degree of their price correlation over the period 2002–2011. Our working hypotheses were tested based on a...

We present a new way to solve generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We assume the feasible set to be compact. Furthermore all functions are assumed to be polynomials. However we do not impose convexity on either the utility functions or the action sets. The key idea is to use Putinar’s...

We present a new way to solve generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We assume the feasible set to be compact. Furthermore all functions are assumed to be polynomials. However we do not impose convexity on either the utility functions or the action sets. The key idea is to use Putinar’s...