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Strategy-proofness and indentical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 65 (2018) 4, pp. 1045-1078

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011949430

Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki - In: Social choice and welfare 46 (2016) 4, pp. 749-766

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452586

Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Wakayama, Takuma - In: International journal of game theory 50 (2021) 3, pp. 773-785

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012622576

Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki - In: Social Choice and Welfare 38 (2012) 3, pp. 473-480

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010848180

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the Cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko - In: Social Choice and Welfare 31 (2008) 3, pp. 457-473

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147156

Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki - In: Social Choice and Welfare 34 (2010) 3, pp. 455-470

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008624653

Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: Improvement of the supremal welfare loss

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki - In: Games and Economic Behavior 89 (2015) C, pp. 101-121

We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty, and non-bossiness. We show that w-hybrid rules improve the supremal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190619