We present the findings of an experimental game of bribery based on Mookherjee and Png's model where inspectors are hired to find evidence against firm owners who have violated some regulation. Inspectors choose costly effort that determines the probability of finding evidence and allows them to...

We examine the impact of one-time threats of expulsion and punishment on voluntary contributions in a public goods game. Participants played in 15-round sessions where they were allowed to vote to remove other subjects only after round 5 and in one design also voted whether to punish the...

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to study the role of bribery in subsidized credit markets in developing countries. First, the authors use the data to test whether more productive borrowers will pay larger or smaller bribes since the theoretical literature offers conflicting findings...

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to study the role of bribery in subsidized credit markets in developing countries. First, the authors use the data to test whether more productive borrowers will pay larger or smaller bribes since the theoretical literature offers conflicting findings...