Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 17,572
Cover Image
Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
Sağlam, İsmail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or to remain single at the beginning of the first period. Individuals … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754874
Cover Image
Chapter 17. Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources
Snmez, Tayfun; Utku nver, M. - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 781-852). 2011
We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025686
Cover Image
Matching with quorums
Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 1, pp. 14-17
In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665671
Cover Image
Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 1-14
We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719484
Cover Image
Tiered Housing Allocation: an Experimental Analysis
Carrillo, Juan D; Singhal, Saurabh - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We study in the laboratory, a variant of the house allocation with existing tenants problem where agents are partitioned into tiers with different privileges. Members of higher tiers receive their allocation before those in lower tiers and can also take the endowment of a member of a lower tier...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854498
Cover Image
Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Journal of Economic Theory 152 (2014) C, pp. 105-129
it is possible to construct Pareto-efficient matchings that match the same incompatible pairs while matching the least …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043010
Cover Image
Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange
Nicoló, Antonio; Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 299-310
Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor–patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if the programs consider the quality of the matches between patients and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049781
Cover Image
Group robust stability in matching markets
Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 394-398
misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049837
Cover Image
A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
Tang, Qianfeng; Yu, Jingsheng - In: Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) C, pp. 543-561
We revisit the school choice problem with consent proposed by Kesten [12], which seeks to improve the efficiency of the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) by obtaining students' consent to give up their priorities. We observe that for students to consent, we should use their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076678
Cover Image
Household consumption when marriage is stable
Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; Rock, Bram de; … - 2014
. Stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We characterize stable marriage …We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption …. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412294