Energy economy optimization (EEO) models employ formal search techniques to explore the future decision space over several decades in order to deliver policy-relevant insights. EEO models are a critical tool for decision-makers who must make near-term decisions with long-term effects in the face...

Decisions about public goods in the real world are frequently made by trustees—individuals responsible for managing pools of contributed funds—rather than by the contributors themselves. We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare contributions made by trustees who play with other trustees...

This is a survey and discussion of work covering both formal game theory and experimental gaming prior to 1991. It is a useful preliminary introduction to the considerable change and emphasis which has taken place since that time where dynamics, learning, and local optimization have challenged...

This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitionsâ€) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter...

This paper explores the extent to which individuals trust, reciprocate, cooperate, and pool risk. We use a battery of field experiments containing the trust game, the voluntary contribution mechanism, and the risk-pooling game, which we apply in six capital cities in Latin America. A salient...

When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses "populist' policies - i.e., policies to the left...

Public school systems generally use one of the three competing mechanisms – the Boston mechanism, the deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycle mechanism – for assigning students to specific schools. Although the literature generally claims that the Boston mechanism is Pareto...

We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the...

We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed...