This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement:...

This paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation-proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller-buyer scenario in which the information regarding the agents' valuations is nonverifiable. This paper explicitly adds a time...

For a market with a finite number of agents, pairwise matching, and bargaining, it is shown that, even when the market is frictionless, the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive. It depends on the amount of information agents use. If their behavior is conditioned only on the sets of agents...

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Lecture 1. Preferences -- Lecture 2. Utility -- Lecture 3. Choice -- Lecture 4. Consumer Preferences -- Lecture 5. Demand: Consumer Choice -- Lecture 6. Choice over Budget Sets and the Dual Consumer -- Lecture 7. The Producer -- Lecture 8....